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The anti-colonial nationalist movement in India was signifi cantly con-
stituted by propagandizing popular art and literature at the same time 
as it established new and popular modes of expression. Literature pro-
scribed by the government and newspaper culture of the decades leading 
to Independence (1920–1947) attest to the above as, does the fact that 
the editorial policy of newspapers it supported absorbed the colonial 
government.1 The shift in the movement from mass protest to constitu-
tional negotiations, that occurred around 1945, also saw an intriguing 
shift in the place of the press. From being central because of its propa-
gandizing power, it became, seemingly, about as marginal as the people 
themselves, returned to a press’s usual role as ‘disseminator’ of informa-
tion. It could be argued, however, that the press occupied an even more 
critical place between 1945 and 1947 for in these years it was the only 
public forum that continued to legitimize the participation of a people 
aggressively lobbied previously by leaders keen fi rst to organize and then 
maintain the momentum of the anti-colonial movement.2 In the culmi-
nating year, 1947, editorial pages are given over to polemical debate and 
political problem solving—should there be one or two nations? Where 
should the boundaries be located and in accordance with what princi-
ples?—that parallel similar debates occurring behind closed doors at the 
political centre. While letters to the editor, articles, aphorisms, gossip 
columns are lively indeed, and obsessively political, editorial cartoons 
surpass these forums of opinion in their wrestling with a vexed politi-
cal process by recoursing to heavily infl ammatory visual rhetoric.3 It is, 
of course, in the nature of editorial cartoons to be polemical and in-
fl ammatory. What makes such rhetoric surprising in this instance is the 
fact that censorship and self-monitoring were never more severe than in 
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1947. Judging by the prolifi c production of such cartoons in 1947, the 
genre itself escaped the censor’s eye but not the ever-watchful eye of the 
public, some of who comment on the ‘injudicious’ nature of cartoons 
on their leaders.4
In these years, the political cartoon is, literally, a radical intervention 
in a discursive fi eld heavily determined and weighted by a naturalized 
‘consciousness’ of the need to be very circumspect. Considering what 
kind of ‘frank’ social history leaks out in editorial pages in this last and 
exclusionary stage of the movement is a large and fascinating project. 
Here I attempt to unpack the editorial culture of nationalist newspa-
pers such as the Hindustan Times, Tribune, Pioneer, the National Herald, 
Janata and Leader as such a culture was inscribed in the (playful) form 
of the political cartoon.5 I do so by directing attention to the fi gure 
to appear most consistently in the nationalist press’s English-language 
dailies and weeklies, in 1947, and to have provoked the most anxiety, 
Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the leader of the All India Muslim League and, 
for the Congress, the most intractable fi gure of opposition to their own, 
and ‘modern,’ view of a state.6 In addition to considering the discourse 
that builds around the fi gure of Jinnah as well as what authorizes it, I 
attempt to establish the kind of untidy intermixture and complexity, to 
borrow terms from Gyan Prakash, that typifi ed the thinking and rhe-
torical expression of an elite anxious to be read by the world community 
as the generation responsible for bringing India into modernity.7 
Although it is inadvisable to read texts, visual or otherwise, by a single 
individual or group as representative, in the instance of the cartoon, 
there is perhaps some ground for making qualifi ed claims for a larger 
culture based on such a reading. A commonplace understanding of the 
genre is that it is clearly motivated to convince its readership. Given this 
overriding objective, to communicate, the political cartoon draws on 
the cultural collective for its performative, formal and thematic aspects. 
In other words, although cartoonists do indeed offer a point of view, 
making this point of view effectively requires “a tapping into familiar 
cultural constructs” (xiv), as Janis Edwards has most recently noted. 
This manifestation of a shared context in the editorial cartoon allows 
us to speculate about the shared culture and political and psychological 
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framework of the class of reader. Further, although it has proved to be 
near impossible to locate the cartoonists’ biographies, the very choice of 
language—English—and political involvement they display, the texts 
they draw on and rhetorical sensibility they exercise suggest we are deal-
ing with an Indian elite, the product of a colonial education. At all 
levels, we note a familiarity with western texts, history and ideologies, 
and often an internalized judgement of social formations that is trace-
able to a ‘western’ value system.8 
I
1947 stands out in memory as a liminal time, marked by unprecedented 
levels of tension, anxiety, uncertainty and a violence that destroyed com-
munities across India, left around a million dead (the majority were mur-
dered) and twelve to sixteen million dislocated.9 Overwhelming anxiety, 
panic even, of a population bewildered by ‘rumors’ circulating about the 
political arrangements being negotiated behind closed doors is clear from 
letters received by political parties such as the Congress. Urvashi Butalia, 
for instance, notes that the All India Congress Committee “. . . received 
large numbers of letters from people wanting to know what was hap-
pening. What will become of us, they asked. We believe India is to be 
partitioned: where will we go? How will we go? What will happen to our 
jobs? If we have to move, will we get our old jobs back in the new home-
land? What will happen to our homes, our lands, if we have to move?” 
(53). Panic is equally apparent in cartoons, as in other editorial forms of 
expression, where there is a narrowing of interest to the political stage, 
that further narrows, seemingly naturally, to a few political fi gures, of 
whom Jinnah is the most represented and overdetermined, as we have 
come to expect of the ‘othered.’10 
The manner in which Jinnah was othered in this year reveals some 
fancy foot-work, so to speak, on the part of cartoonists.11 Powerfully 
suggestive analogies turned fl imsy and, at best, superfi cial resemblance 
into exact, fi xed and wildly inappropriate conclusions in which Jinnah 
was clearly the moral if not political loser. Two of the most startling com-
parisons to which Jinnah was subject in 1947 are with Dr. Frankenstein 
and Hitler. There are probably no two other fi gures that signal our col-
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lective fears of scientifi c-technological discourse itself and its accom-
plishing the unthinkable banalizing of evil it did in Nazi Germany re-
spectively. Questions that spring immediately to mind are: what did it 
mean to suggest Jinnah’s ‘true’ (not cultural or racial but typological in 
this context) lineage hovers between these two fi gures that mark the 
‘gothic’ limits of modernity? In other words, what kind of narrative does 
a choice of these texts authorize? And why does this generation of car-
toonist choose these texts? 
“Frankenstein” (Hindustan Times, 20 March) comments on a press re-
lease by Jinnah, which is substantially reproduced in the text note that 
reads: “Mr. Jinnah has broken his long silence on the Punjab happen-
ings to exhort the majority community to remember their responsibili-
ties to the minorities and offer to protect them.” Far from illustrating the 
text note, the cartoon savagely satirizes it. Jinnah/Frankenstein, stands 
beside a giant-sized, empty coffi n in his laboratory and is confronted by 
its former occupant, the enraged monster/“Communal Bestiality”, who 
wields a spiked club. The moment in this narrative of ‘horror let loose 
on the world’ dramatized by the visual is a moment which pointedly 
remarks on the helplessness of the agent in the face of his creation—
Jinnah gestures to the coffi n, in a seemingly futile attempt to convince 
the monster to return to the coffi n. There is a twist to the original in this 
domestication of Mary Shelley’s novel. Apparently a more essentialist 
view of the horror (evil) is required: beside the open door to the labora-
tory stands a horned man (presumably a devil of sorts), dressed in a suit, 
who appears to be amused by the scene he is witnessing (see fi g. 1).
Shelley’s novel is employed in identical fashion in a cartoon that ap-
peared later in the year in Hindustan Times. Titled “‘Hey, You, Come 
Back!’” (3 Sept), the cartoon adopts a similar strategy of containment 
of a history that had, by then, resolved into a bloody civil war. The 
visual savages the pro-active position taken by Jinnah to control vio-
lence, which is referred to in the text note: “Mr Jinnah broadcast an 
appeal from Lahore to his co-religionists to stop the orgy of violence 
in the Punjab.” Jinnah stands in the doorway of “Dr. Frankenstein’s 
Laboratory” and beckons to a towering monster “Communal Hatred,” 
who ignores him more clearly in this cartoon than in the previous one 
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(here he has turned his back on Jinnah). The monster carries a bat in 
one hand and fl ames issue from his blackened body. Given that the 
monster is moving away from the building and into the fi eld, clearly he 
has no intention of returning to the building.
Read as visual propaganda, the two cartoons, with text notes that focus 
our attention on Jinnah, suggest the cartoonist intends to impress upon 
his readers only Jinnah’s hypocrisy or capacity for equivocation. Jinnah/
Frankenstein, the ambitious politician, creates a monster/“communal 
atrocities” while on the surface of it seeming to be a secular, liberal poli-
tician, working to effect a quantum change in the human-political con-
dition. That is, a casual reading encourages one to ‘recognize’ the car-
toons employ Mary Shelley’s novel metaphorically, to locate Jinnah as a 
type, and to instruct us how to ‘read’ his role in shaping modern Indian 
history. Such a reading, the cartoons suggest, is a much-required cor-
rective of the reading suggested by Jinnah’s rhetorical stance, as such a 
stance is manifest in his statements to the press.
Figure 1.
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Interrogating the intertextual reference further, however, reveals far 
less stability of meaning. First of all, the intertextual reference locates 
Jinnah squarely in the discourse of power except that he is made to si-
multaneously occupy the position of powerful and powerless. He is, 
indeed, the spirit of the age embodied—the immensely powerful and 
brilliant man of science, much to be feared. The equivalence of charac-
ter, that establishes him as powerful, however, militates against the tex-
tual moment from the original the cartoonist chooses to dramatize (that 
is, at the performative level)—the moment at which the monster speaks 
his defi ance of his creator, after having been thwarted by him one more 
time in his, the monster’s, attempt to establish his own family—for the 
latter signals Jinnah’s defeat, and that too by his own creation. In the 
face of his creation, then, he is powerless.
Further, what appears to be the given because of the visual syntax—
the bond of fi liation between the doctor and the monster—is not. The 
cartoons are emphatic in their assertion that the monster is an embodi-
ment of a non-community-specifi c violence, in which case Jinnah could 
hardly be considered the sole author (as author he is restricted to the 
League, its constituency and, if one really stretches the analogy, which 
this press did, the Pakistan demand),12 and if he can, then all involved 
in the mass violence are his progeny, a conclusion that works only if one 
removes Partition with all its materiality to the level of allegory. In other 
words, while textual layering serves the purpose of locating Jinnah as the 
cause of the horrifi c slaughter, providing a rationale for the incompre-
hensible, the analogical inexactness that invests the central relationship 
both loosens the association of agent/Frankenstein/Jinnah and violence/
monster and relegates the whole issue to the more comfortable level of 
the allegorical (where one does not bother with questions such as: “how 
can Congress supporters be linked genealogically with Jinnah?”) and 
where one continues to evade the very material nature of the violence 
that devastated the subcontinent, especially in 1947.
Finally, through their visual privileging of the monster—a result of 
perspectival distortion—and hence what he embodies, violence, (where-
as the text note suggests Jinnah is the focus of the illustration), the car-
toons suggest a competing interest in commenting on the historical nar-
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rative to which Jinnah ‘belongs’—the struggle over collective identity. If 
we interrogate this evidence of a split focus in the cartoon, we are led to 
the conclusion that there is some uncertainty about the object of com-
ment—is Jinnah or violence the subject? (This wavering is of course au-
thorized, as it were, by the intertextual reference. After all, at the centre of 
Mary Shelley’s narrative there are two voiced and mutually constitutive 
narratives, Dr. Frankenstein’s and the monster’s). If it is both, then the 
intertextual moment and reference at once ‘acknowledges’ the moment 
to be horrifi c (violence is its own agent) and, because of the metonymic 
dimension to the specifi c textual moment that is dramatized, predicts a 
defeat of the threat, presumably both Frankenstein/Jinnah and monster/
violence. We would also conclude that Jinnah was not the object, indeed 
the other, so much as a much-needed modality. It was the horror of mass, 
gratuitous violence preceding and constituting Partition that could or 
would not be articulated outside of a satisfying cause and hence required 
the presence of a constructed other. (Jinnah may have served other pur-
poses before; this is a very specifi c purpose to a specifi c end).13 There is 
the rare cartoon that attempts a loosening of the Jinnah-Partition asso-
ciation, a fact that only serves to reinforce the conclusion that other car-
toons are deliberate indeed in the visual syntax with which they invest 
Shelley’s novel in their adaptation of the novel to their own uses. For in-
stance, in “Frankenstein Monster” (Pioneer, 1 April) a charred monster, 
“Communal Flare-Ups,” stalks a devastated landscape, littered with up-
rooted road signs and skeletal shapes of former buildings. The signs read: 
“Bombay,” “Calcutta,” “Delhi,” “Punjab,” “N.W.F.P,” “Bihar,” Assam” 
and “U.P” and thus serve to locate the extent of the devastation. The 
feeling of hopelessness—the inability to prevent the further unravelling 
of the horrifi c—is evident in the fact that even the leaders, here Gandhi 
and Jinnah, fl ee the path of the approaching monster. The cartoonist ap-
pears to refrain from ‘naming’ an agent, a reading that is substantiated 
by the editorial, which reads: “The situation in India is fast getting out 
of hand even for these accredited leaders when from sporadic rioting it 
has turned to intermittent rioting.” 
It is diffi cult, indeed, to defi nitively conclude about intent with so 
many instabilities in place. These instabilities are, in themselves, howev-
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er, telling of the historical reality with which this press and its readership 
is attempting to grapple in these cartoons as much as they are of the state 
of the inscriber. It is not diffi cult to surmise that paradoxes that inform 
the intertextual reference are dictated by, on the one hand, a well-re-
hearsed public need to refrain from fuelling ‘communal’ sentiment, 
hence the non-community-specifi c monster (genealogically speaking), 
and on the other by an apparently equally urgent need to locate a ra-
tionale for the catastrophic and the incomprehensible. We note the fact 
that these cartoons reveal, via the intertextual reference too, the extent of 
the fear and anxiety Jinnah was able to instill in the nationalist press (he 
is powerful and powerless). We can also speculate about the potential use 
of Shelley’s novel to provide or invest an Indian historical moment itself 
with the political order it lacked (confl ated with moral order, also via the 
intertextual reference). The fi ctional prototype, used as it is to trace the 
contours of a historically, culturally and politically remote ‘drama,’ su-
perimposes its conclusions: if there was a decisive victory in the original 
to the drama of the battle between the forces of good and evil, (surely) 
there would be one in its latest and contemporary equivalent.
Finally, and this conclusion identifi es the ‘particular’ nature of the 
expected unintended surplus of meaning that attends the intended and 
textual message of the cartoons, given the likelihood that the monster 
would, irrespective of the lettering sprawled across the body, be received 
as the Muslim League by the contemporary reader of nationalist news-
papers familiar both with Shelley’s text and with the political situation 
in India, the cartoons tempt one to read against the stated objective and 
in so doing ‘discover’ or misrecognize Muslim mentality to be a volatile, 
violent one. So perhaps there is an allying of the anxiety that attaches 
to the monster/overwhelming violence after all at the same time as its 
articulation: the monster that stalks is ‘named’ without actually being 
named because of the choice of textual layering. The implicitly conveyed 
content reveals an essentialist view (communities have distinct qualities) 
that confl icts with a more conscious disarticulation of this same view 
thath so emphatically occupies the textual level of the same cartoons.
Hitler, the other fi gure to be used repeatedly in the attempt to fi gure 
Jinnah, appears to be invoked in a similar capacity, both for the purpose 
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of ‘identifying’ Jinnah’s character (here fascist) and for the purpose of 
a seemingly analogous narrative moment. Hitler’s expansionist policy, 
and the enabling of it by the Allied forces, appears to have been re-
quired to provide the commensurate discursive context within which to 
locate Jinnah. Many cartoons in which the subject is the amazing power 
of Jinnah/Hitler to dictate to the larger force, the Congress, appear in 
1947. That is, the cartoons makes a pointed reference to its illogicality. 
In “The Big Two Meet” (National Herald , 8 May), the text balloon de-
scribes Jinnah as the “Fuehrer” (“To meet Mr. Jinnah Mahatmaji had 
again to [go to] the League Fuehrer’s house”). As Mohammed goes to 
the mountain, the Allies go to Hitler and Gandhi goes to Jinnah. As in 
the Frankenstein cartoons, here too the extravagant location of Jinnah 
as powerful (in others he is both powerful and powerless) reveals a sig-
nifi cant level of anxiety.
A more pervasive layering plays specifi cally on Hitler’s demand of a 
Polish corridor, encouraging us to misrecognize Jinnah’s demand, of a 
corridor connecting East and West Pakistan, as a demand of the same 
order as Hitler’s. For instance, an editorial article entitled “Pakistan and 
After: A Warning,” by Dr. Balkrishna Keskar” (National Herald, 29 
June), describes Jinnah’s territorial demands in a subsection titled “Hitler 
Tactics”: “It would not be out of place to remind them that Hitler was 
also ridiculed in the same way at fi rst. No one took him seriously though 
he was in dead earnest. Mr. Jinnah is no less serious and earnest.” The 
May 25th issue of Janata too refers to Jinnah as the “League Fuehrer” 
who desires “corridors to connect the various bits of Pakistan though 
he knows that once separation is conceded by the Congress, it will take 
a war to establish right of way from Karachi to Dacca.” Consider the 
two-frame “Pages from Modern History” (Leader, 29 May). In the fi rst 
panel, Jinnah and Hitler do the Hitler march/salute, each with a paper 
in his hand with “Wanted a Corridor for Pakistan” and “Demand for a 
Polish Corridor” written on it respectively. In the next panel, however, 
Hitler sits in a bunker, looking despondent and drinking. Jinnah, who 
has apparently ‘caught him in the act’ so to speak, looks dismayed at this 
sign of defeat. A few days later, an editorial column ‘interprets’ the car-
toon for the readership, almost as if there could be no end to a rehears-
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ing of the analogy or as if informed by the need to prolong the life of the 
analogy: “Oomen’s cartoon . . . is suggestive. Mr. Jinnah’s demand for a 
corridor is compared to that of Hitler’s. By his disgraceful conduct for 
the last about 10 years Mr. Jinnah has more than amply demonstrated 
that there can b no end to his demands. After every act of aggression 
in Europe, when his armies occupied one country after another, Herr 
Hitler tried to declare: ‘I have no more territorial ambitions in Europe 
but I insist on having the German colonies.’ What was the ambitious 
Fuehrer’s fate? It is high time Mohamed Ali Jinnah paused to refl ect over 
this.” Or, consider the 8 June “Cavalcade” (Leader ) where in the fi rst 
panel Jinnah, dressed in Nazi uniform, stares into a hand mirror while 
Liaquat Ali Khan, dressed in similar fashion, asks Jinnah: “What Shall 
Be Our Next Territorial Demand, Mein Fuehrer?”14 
The focus of these editorial comments and cartoons on a recent ex-
ample of a terrifying policy of appeasement, that is, the suggestion that 
a fi tting analogy for the Indian political situation of 1947 is the political 
situation of late 1930s Europe, testifi es not only to the panic of the press 
as does the ambivalence that surrounds the fi gure of Jinnah/Hitler.15 It 
suggests the recent war quite literally haunts and, possibly, dictates the 
reading of the political struggle between the Muslim League and the 
Congress: here, as in the Frankenstein cartoons, in its metonymic di-
mension, the intertextual reference serves the function of narrativizing 
the historical moment both in terms of the moment—a struggle be-
tween the normative (here, as ever, the spatially absent Congress/Allied 
forces) and the deviant, aberrant other—and in terms of the trajectory 
of history in which the moment belongs. At this level, the cartoons pre-
dict a reassuring outcome (victory of the secular, modern forces), there-
by containing the very anxiety the cartoons also express.
This badly needed reassurance is presumably the reason for the pre-
ponderance of the outrageous comparison of historical moments: as a 
type of narrative, the penultimate instance of which was the history lead-
ing to the Second World War, the outcome was tropically secured when 
in reality it was not. Hence the presence of cartoons locating Jinnah in 
fascism that appear anxious to underline and instruct on Jinnah’s ‘true’ 
lineage. To offer one example only, in “Heavenly Blessings” (Leader 25 
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Aug), Jinnah plants a sword /“Sub-Section of Section 51” on the prone 
body of “Frontier Democracy” and does the Hitler salute to Hitler and 
Franco, who appear in a cloud, obviously his guardian angels. Hitler 
says: “Excellent Start” and Franco, “Exactly What We Would Have 
Done” (see fi g. 2).
Many other metaphors and texts are brought into play in the attempt 
to ‘contain’ the fi gure of Jinnah, and sometimes the incomprehensible 
via him, some clearly western and some indigenous. Curiously enough, 
these share with the Frankenstein and Hitler cartoons an adherence to 
the tradition and discursive expressions of rationalism (scientifi c ratio-
nalism in the instance of the Frankenstein cartoons). That is, they sug-
gest a grounding of the inscribing culture in this tradition. There is at 
least one other study that arrives at a similar conclusion. Although s/he 
does not speculate about the reasons for the location of Jinnah in the 
irrational, Saumya Gupta, in a discussion of the shifting representation 
of Jinnah in a local daily of Kanpur (Vartman), states that post-1944, 
Figure 2.
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Jinnah was represented as “. . . an irrational and overbearing madman” 
(182). There are many other places where we sense the presence of a 
rationalist approach, nowhere more so than in cartoons employing the 
most common of philosophical dualities of this tradition, that of nature 
and culture, to offer derisive comment on Jinnah. We note it also in 
overt judgements that are informed by terms locatable in same inheri-
tance, locating ‘communalism’ via the monster in the irrational, aber-
rant and gothic, for instance.
The nature-culture duality, with all its attendant bias, appears to be 
a favorite. In many of these cartoons Jinnah is not associated with vi-
olence, that is his presence is not required to explain away violence, 
and yet the positioning of Jinnah in the ‘irrational’ and ‘illogical’ ap-
pears to be important to accomplish, as does a positioning him in terms 
of the simultaneously powerful and powerless. Consider “Which Way 
Will the Cat Jump?” (Hindustan Times, 25 April), where he is a cat (a 
curious choice, given the relative unimportance of the animal in the 
Indian symbolic and mythic apparatuses). Given the fact that all the 
cat does is wail, the message appears to be that there is no purpose (it 
is habitual and instinctive), meaning and reason to Jinnah’s utteranc-
es and arguments. At the same time, Jinnah/cat is powerful enough to 
give Mountbatten sleepless nights (see fi g. 3). When nature is employed 
clearly in terms of received symbolic associations, as in “The Sun, the 
Moon and the Flying Saucers,” Jinnah is accorded some power—he is 
a force in nature—but always signifi cantly less than the Congress. Here 
he is the moon to Nehru’s sun, probably playing on the fact that the 
sickle moon, along with a star, is the symbol of Islam (Hindustan Times, 
17 July), but it also brings to mind the western construction of this par-
ticular binary, in which the sun is associated with masculinity/rational-
ity and the moon with their opposites (Hindu mythology gives far more 
place to the moon), and the fact that, scientifi cally speaking, the moon 
is not its own source of light as well as its association with lunacy and 
‘supernatural’ phenomena (evil walks abroad at night) (see fi g. 4).16 
There are some cartoons that speak of Jinnah’s inability to control the 
history he has unleashed (the given)—as does the Frankenstein refer-
ence—that draw on the natural world too. He is often represented as an 
13
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inept, itinerant snake-charmer , unable to control the cobra once it has 
been released from its basket. In “Snake Charmer!” (Hindustan Times, 
7 Sept), a giant snake/“Pakistan—Mob Rule” towers over a terrifi ed 
snake-charmer/Jinnah who is unable to continue playing the fl ute, the 
crucial instrument of control. Here too one fi nds the odd cartoon that 
does not single out Jinnah, a fact that only emphasizes the deliberateness 
investing the insistence on the association in a majority of cartoons. For 
instance, in an untitled cartoon that appeared in Janata, 24 Nov, 1946 
(a paper far more critical of the Congress than say the Hindustan Times) 
the same motif appears but here the snake charmer is problematized (he 
is not a political fi gure but “ignorance” embodied) and Jinnah, along 
with Congress leaders, is imagined as a perplexed and horrifi ed specta-
tor. A huge cobra /“Communal Violence,” fangs bared, hisses while the 
snake charmer, blindfolded (the blindfold reads “Ignorance”), plays the 
fl ute. The two fi gures are surrounded by a Muslim and a Brahmin, who 
cling to a tree they have climbed to avoid the cobra, while Jinnah and 
Patel watch the tableau.17 
The other recurrent category of the nature-culture opposition to be 
employed in cartoons, in general concerned with ‘illustrating’ the ‘illogi-
cal’ arrangement of power, fi nds Jinnah being subjected to cross-dressing 
(signals trans-gendering) , if not exactly gender-bending. For instance, in 
some he is a woman of ill-repute (there was probably no greater insult at 
the time) attempting to exercise power through the ‘illegitimate’ means 
of female sexuality. The Hindustan Times’ multipanel “Chalti Duniya” 
of 23 March has Jinnah playing the female to the NWFP/male. The text 
balloon reads “The Tough-Guy Who Won’t Be Tempted. There were 
cries of ‘No, No,’ When At A Meeting Dr. Khan Sahib Suggested That 
He Resign The Frontier Premiership.”18 The male fi gure rests his hand 
on a gun and looks unmoved as Jinnah, dressed provocatively, attempts 
to persuade him to join. In Jinnah’s hand there is a placard that reads 
“We Shall Sacrifi ce All For Pakistan.” In “May It Please Your Highness” 
(National Herald, 13 May) Jinnah, a dancing girl, does a kathak dance 
(“Undivided Punjab” is written on the swirling skirt) for the Maharaja, 
who sits apparently unmoved. Behind the dancing girl/Jinnah we dis-
cover Liaquat and other Muslim League notaries who provide the music 
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to which Jinnah dances. The cartoon is a tongue-in-cheek comment on 
the following news item that appears below as a text note: “Mr. Jinnah 
saw the Maharajah of Patiala in the Imperial Hotel” (see fi g. 5).19 This 
repetition of a trope fundamental to colonial rule, colonizer/male and 
colonized/female, with all its attendant ambiguity, combines here with 
the ambivalent location of the feminine in a Hindu-dominated culture 
and the evocative turn associated with the sari (a predominantly Hindu 
form of dress) in this reference.
Even in cartoons offering an allegorical reading that stems from a far 
more literal reading, by drawing on the notion of the body politic for 
instance, the message informing the visual text is that Jinnah’s position 
borders on the illogical, irrational. Consider the following, more lit-
eral treatment of Jinnah’s demand of a corridor linking East and West 
Pakistan. In “The Corridor” (National Herald , 27 May) Jinnah forces 
his arm through the stomach of a Congressman/India (note the gol-
balizing of the Congress and its position here) in order to shake hands 
with Suhrawardy, who stands on the other side of the man.20 The 
Figure 5.
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Congressman’s reaction is the primary concern of the cartoon: he has 
his hands outstreched and is screaming in agony. Quite literally, Jinnah 
violates the body politic. Another interesting, literal treatment of the 
subject, that draws on the technology-nature, industrial-rural opposi-
tion too identifi es Jinnah with the technological only to offer him and 
his ideological position as the by now familiar illogical one. Consider 
“Wanted a Corridor” (Leader, 27 May). Here, Jinnah is the driver of 
a steam-roller preparing to bulldoze a rural dwelling. In front of two 
open doors/“U.P”; “Bihar” to the hut stand two Congressmen, with 
their hands raised calmly in rejection of Jinnah, who says to them: “Be 
Reasonable. I only want a little passage” (see fi g. 6). Jinnah, the force of 
the mechanical and industrial attempts an invasion of tranquil, rural, 
agrarian India/Congress. His decision that the reasonable and logi-
cal method of connecting a separated homeland is to bull-doze states/
homes (same sense as in heim and here the given) is clearly offered as 
not only illogical but distinctly immoral. It is indeed a violation of the 
home/state/nation (in many more cartoons visualized as a woman sub-
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II
To return to the questions, what authorizes the reading of Jinnah and 
what kind of narrative does such a fi guring authorize? The vast and 
multi-cultural metaphoric matrix, I have suggested, is grounded in the 
(colonial inheritance of ) discourse of reason. Texts and historical mo-
ments that immediately signal a stand-off between the liberal-human-
ist, rationalist tradition and the (excessive) scientifi c age, images that 
employ inherited dualities typical of rationalist thought, nature-culture 
for instance, and others that reveal an outright arbitrary use of irrelevant 
images to dramatize illogicality, the principle itself, naturalize, authorize 
and legitimize the reading offered of Jinnah. The reading, in turn, sug-
gests the large amorphous discourse, loosely describable as rationalism, 
best ‘explains’ or ‘discovers’ modern Indian history: it, this history, it is 
suggested is replete with scenes of the gothic, scientifi c ambition, fascist 
mentality, the irrational, instinctual and the fantastic.21 
Other questions spring to mind: Why invest so much in Jinnah? And 
why construct such a narrative? Given that in 1947 he appears to serve 
more as a means of dealing with the incomprehensible scale of violence 
that dominated much of north India (in fact, there appears to be a de-
liberate encouragement of ‘forgetting’ Jinnah’s biography of involve-
ment in the nationalist movement, encouraged, of course, by the genre 
itself—tending to the synchronic and static—and a fi lling of the histor-
ical screen with a Jinnah inextricably and indelibly associated with the 
violence of Partition),22 his importance lies in the fact that he enabled 
this majority press to provide its readers a means of evading, by other-
ing, the dominant discourse of communalism, so publicly disavowed by 
Congress leaders as an adequate explanation of the violence engulfi ng 
so many communities, especially in north India.23 And such an evasion 
was important for at least two reasons: in the rhetoric emerging from 
the Congress leadership, ‘communalism’ was an embarrassing indicator 
of the ‘backwardness’ of the Indian people and of their containment in 
atavistic ritual practices. Gyan Pandey points out, for instance, that the 
reactions of Gandhi and Nehru to the violence of Partition suggest they 
read “. . . most kinds of mass violence, as the work of the ‘backward’ 
people who were unfortunately ill-educated and insuffi ciently enlight-
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ened” (“Prose of Otherness” 195). In their manifest need to participate 
in an othering of communalism, then, what these cartoons reveal is the 
absolute cultural divide that existed between the urban, westernized 
elite and the critical mass of people involved in the many horrifi c forms 
that violence took in 1947, the damaging extent of which could hardly 
have been clear to the former. Many have testifi ed they committed vio-
lence in the name of ‘honor,’ both familial and ‘religious.’ There is a 
critical mass of testimonials where men remember the deaths of their 
womenfolk, often at the hands of the men, as martyrdom too.24 Others 
consider the violence that they and their families experienced, and pre-
sumably committed as well, as a price worth paying for its enabling 
of a ‘homeland.’ Ian Talbot, for instance, reproduces an interview with 
a Pakistani who survived Partition in which the latter remembers the 
violence that took many family members as a sacrifi ce and the family 
members as martyrs (“I had lost everything, forty people of our (ex-
tended) family were martyred, but the happiness I found when I saw 
the Pakistani fl ag fl ying at the Pakistan border, is still living in every cell 
of my body” (qtd. in Talbot 200). The othering of violence is, appar-
ently, not as global a need as it was naturalized into being in the rheto-
ric of the elite.
Communalism was also that against which the Congress leadership 
defi ned itself and the future state of India as secular and modern, fi ll-
ing these categories in an expected globalizing way. Indeed, one of 
the received and privileged readings of the Congress is that it posit-
ed ‘nationalism’ as the opposite of ‘communalism,’ an opposition de-
constructed by Pandey in his Construction of Communalism. There was 
much riding, then, on evading the discourse of communalism for it 
was indeed against it that the Congress and its affi liates constructed 
the, even today, dominant image of their (and the nation’s) modernity. 
Besides, in 1947, assumptions about secularism, about secularism being 
the privileged other to communalism, were most likely to be threat-
ened or seriously contested because of the increasing incidence of vio-
lence across India (identifi ed in the popular imagination with commu-
nalism). In the rhetoric emerging from Congress and its affi liates, we 
witness the reifi cation of secularism and attendant notions and the bur-
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dening of one fi gure, Jinnah, with all that was considered retrogressive. 
In 1947, then, the practically quotidian appearance of Jinnah in car-
toons appears to have offered the momentary satisfaction that derives 
from the knowledge that the collective ‘we,’ naturalized into a complic-
it, imagined community by virtue of readership, have defi nitively locat-
ed the cause of, in this instance, the unthinkably horrifi c and originary 
moment of the birth of India, the ‘modern’ nation.
The presence of the stereotypical other, but, as we have noticed, a 
rather polyvalent one, thus reveals the instability masked by the assur-
ance Congress and its affi liates displayed, as is typical of majority cul-
tures. It is the underbelly, so to speak, of the confi dence. If we push this 
consideration of the role of visual culture and discourse in determining 
or reinforcing identity further, we would confront yet another destabi-
lizing function of cartoons on Jinnah associated by Homi Bhabha, most 
notably, with the stereotype.25 More specifi cally, if we apply Bhabha’s 
conclusions about what it is the stereotype signifi es in the colonial con-
struction of the indigenous other to the construction of Jinnah by the 
Congress-affi liated press, we would conclude that the surplus meaning 
(manifest in the uncertainty surrounding the fi gure by virtue of inter-
textual and metaphoric references) suggests Jinnah destabilizes the very 
security and identity of the dominant, inscribing culture: being identi-
fi ed, in cartoons or elsewhere, with communalism, Jinnah threatened 
the very globalizing of the Congress approach to statehood necessary 
for the illusion of its inevitability and its identity with the very desirable 
mode of modernity. In other words, Jinnah does not ‘perform’ in ways 
required—to be the ‘same’—and thus threatens the very globalizing im-
pulse typical of a majority culture or ideological position. He thus also 
threatens the ability to present the same position as an inevitable one. At 
the same time, as mentioned elsewhere in this article, Jinnah was needed 
as other, in order that Congress/modernity/state could gain boundaries 
of defi nition. In the very contours of the construction we trace, ironi-
cally enough, the same strategic function of the other and the same bind 
(a bind that manifests as the surplus meaning of the narratives implied 
by the metaphoric and metonymic dimensions of the cartoons) as we 
fi nd in the colonial construction of the Indian Other.
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What, though, of the location of Jinnah in the scientifi c (and Congress 
in the agrarian). It is a curious reversal of the general assumption—by 
1947 well in place—that Congress stood for modernity and that Jinnah 
was trapped in feudal modes of thought. However, as we notice, Jinnah 
is located in the images that remind only of rationalism’s excessive reach, 
its dismissing of moral law. Add to this the fact that he is also located 
in the irrational, the fantastic, and the instinctual (nature, woman) as 
we have seen and all we encounter is more ambiguity. The only way in 
which we can place non-rational and the limit of the rational under 
one rubric would be to consider both the ‘other’ side of the rational. By 
virtue of Jinnah’s location on the ‘other’ side of rationalism, Congress—
present even when spatially absent by virtue of the syntactical arrange-
ment of forces in the history involving Jinnah—emerges as the rightful 
(by virtue of the difference established) and the only (by virtue of the 
tenuous need for sameness) inheritor of (Enlightenment) rationalism, 
safe because bound by moral law through choice.26 Thus, these cartoons 
privilege the absent Congress without the latter actually having to be 
turned into a discursive reality. Given the political relations in which 
Jinnah belonged, the image of the Congress could not but lurk behind 
every image of Jinnah. Beyond the world of representation, in these car-
toons the Congress occupies the place of the mysterious, powerful, and 
expansively metaphoric whereas Jinnah is contained by visual and lin-
guistic borders, tending to the stereotypical.
The persistent presence of the rationalist inheritance, remarkable 
precisely because there were more culturally appropriate metaphors 
and rationale (honor and sacrifi ce, and these values naturalized as tra-
dition itself, for instance), suggests a faith in what was the founda-
tional discourse of empire. This, of course, extends the discussion to 
the cartoonists and their readership. We could, and in general would, 
attribute their employment of western texts to the embedded colonial 
education of the elite, which naturalized western modes of thought 
and perception in British India. This would explain the wide-ranging 
choice of texts, indigenous and western, and their manifest need to 
other ‘uncivilized’ behaviour, individually and collectively. Further, one 
could argue they had much invested, via the discourse of empire, in the 
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scientifi c rationalist discourse, as it signaled the much-desired mode of 
modernity.27
However, the employment could also be rather strategic—it could 
also imply a desire to sell the notion that the incomprehensible scale and 
nature of violence that constituted Partition was ‘appropriately’ located 
in more global essentials of character and philosophical developments. 
Susie Tharu has commented on this tendency that she fi nds expressed in 
literature on the Partition: “By representing the partition in ‘universal-
ist’ terms as outrageous. . . these texts inaugurate a narrative and a sub-
jectivity that translates history and politics into a failure of humanism. 
Further, they obscure, within their lyrical and narrative recomposing of 
the nation, the confl icts that led to partition as well as a range of other 
contradictions” (78). Eliding of the specifi cs, including specifi c, local 
cultural formations and inheritances, and hence eliding of the issue of 
responsibility, did indeed invest other attempts, in other genres, to ‘deal 
with’ the horrifi c. So why would it not manifest in the cartoon? On the 
other hand, perhaps it refl ects the unavailability at the time of com-
mensurate metaphors and discourses and the problems attending the 
genre itself, caught as the genre is in the need to refl ect on a process at 
the very moment of its passing. If the only well established discourse, of 
communalism, was not to be subscribed to and legitimized, then what 
other discourse did make sense of the otherwise senseless? It is worth re-
membering that other segments of society had conceptual frameworks, 
a cultural logic if you like, that had explanatory power, the concept of 
honor, for instance.
Finally, the ubiquitous presence of rationalist thought in cartoons on 
Jinnah could be less a sign of colonial mimicry and evidence of a pre-
occupation that had as much to do with this generation’s attempt to 
think through the complexity of (Indian) modernity, evidence that is, 
of this proccupation’s working its way into the lexicon and grab-bag of 
images, notions and discourses that formed part of the archives of the 
press’ imagination as it had to do with a conscious attempt at theoriz-
ing Jinnah (as the other of rationalism) and constructing the history in 
which he fi gures so large at the moment of its making. That is to say, 
it could be part of the intermixtures and untidy complexities Prakash 
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speaks of in his meticulous account of the nationalist movement as a 
movement that did not produce a nation that was a “failed imitation” 
of “colonial modernity,” but “actualized India as a culturally rooted 
moral community with a rational will to industrialize and achieve tech-
nological mastery” (199). If we approached the cartoon culture of na-
tionalist papers of the time with Prakash’s well-substantiated conclusion 
in mind, we would fi nd a staging of Congress in the privileged terms 
of his formulations. That is, Congress is offered as a culturally rooted 
community (here the Gandhian rhetoric is very useful. Congress leaders 
almost always appear in cartoons garbed in the ubiquitous Gandhian 
cap and khadi) and technologically inclined, prepared to adopt the 
Nehruvian approach to modernizing India (hence cartoons that mar-
ginalize Gandhi, albeit by turning him into a deifi ed conscience of the 
nation). When physically absent, as in the cartoons on Jinnah, the same 
reading is provided, albeit by different means: Jinnah is the irrational, 
immoral, excessively rational (a rationalism divorced, that is, from mo-
rality) and sometimes downright ‘evil.’ In other words, in the discourse 
of editorial cartoons, as in the discourse of science in colonial India, we 
fi nd an anxious attempt to assert and reassert the modernity of India/
Congress. Hence Congress is the Allied force to Jinnah’s fascist force, it 
is the supportive and moral family to Jinnah’s Frankenstein and so on. 
It is also the rural, Gandhian fi gure of a vibrant village economy, and 
familial as well. Hence, too, Jinnah is scientifi c and industrial excess 
embodied, the scientifi c principle abstracted from the moral, nature 
unorganized—to the Congress’ rural, agricultural principle—‘rightly’ 
placed in the fantastic, illogical and irrational. This very difference is 
simply and effectively staged in yet another Hitler cartoon, “Another 
Gandhi” (Tribune, 11 January). A large fi gure, who looks a lot like Khan 
Abdul Gaffar Khan, with a bag/“Love, Tolerance, Unity of India” over 
his shoulder walks purposefully toward Bihar. Behind him, Jinnah and 
Liaquat somewhat ineffectually fl ing their legs in his direction, in an at-
tempt to boot him out. Jinnah holds a paper in each hand. One reads 
“Gandhi’s Tour” and the other “Summon Suhrawardy; Exchange of 
Population; Hostages.” Liaquat address Jinnah with: “Hoshyar Fuehrer 
Mein I See Fresh Danger Ahead.” Clearly, “Love, Tolerance and Unity” 
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are so superior that they render Jinnah’s evil intentions ineffectual and 
equally clearly Congress is the ‘inheritor’ of, or genealogically linked 
with, the liberal humanist tradition.
III
The specifi c construction of Jinnah in the nationalist press will not 
come as a surprise to those acquainted with statist accounts of deterio-
rating Congress-League relations, especially in the 1940s. The view that 
Jinnah was the driving force behind the Muslim League and that he 
was, single-handedly, the architect of Pakistan remains a common per-
ception, as does the perception of the Congress as a secular, progressive 
force. Such views, have of course been contested and continue to be so 
with more studies of regional politics of the time and of the fractures 
and fi ssures that obtained within the parties appearing.28 The widening 
of the fi eld of statist history to include class and gender issues also force 
the fi eld open.
The value of studies of the anti-colonial movement in terms of cul-
tural space, which remains a marginal fi eld at best even today (with the 
exception of the Partition, which is beginning to attract much scholarly 
interest), lies in the fact that such studies reveal the mutually constitu-
tive relationship of political and cultural narratives that were being writ-
ten at a time generally accepted by everyone to be a momentous one. 
Political cartoons, for instance, suggest not only by what means Jinnah 
gained the dubious distinction of being the Other but also suggest rea-
sons the public participated in the Othering of Jinnah encouraged by 
the rhetoric emerging from the Congress had little to do with politi-
cal and ideological differences. If the letters written to the Congress 
Working Committee are any indication, the experience of marginaliza-
tion was qualitatively linked with a sense of a complete loss of agency. 
From being a ‘freedom’ movement, the anti-colonial movement had 
turned into one where the object of attack was everyone and no one 
and the attackers were equally everyone and no one (theoretically one 
was attacker by virtue of being Muslim, Hindu or Sikh and attacked 
by virtue of the same mark of identity, now singled out as the primary 
marker of identity). For this change no one had answers, except the one 
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which was deligitimized precisely by its location in the atavastic and un-
civilized—communalism. The confusion surrounding the actantial po-
sition acted itself out in the most horrifi c of ways in the months leading 
to partition with ever-shifting rumored boundaries in the Punjab and 
Bengal led to one community feeling momentarily empowered, enough 
to attack the other, only to In all this uncertainty there was the one con-
stant—Jinnah.
Aside from being of value for the simple fact that it factors in what 
statist histories have traditionally ignored—the critical mass of people 
in whose name leaders made the momentous decision that the interests 
of the people would be best served if there were to be two nations fol-
lowing the end of the ‘Raj,’ not one—a study of the time in terms of 
its cultural spaces serves to indicate how the people were ‘reading’ the 
moment and, indeed, what the moment was for them.
Notes
 1 J. N. Sahni, a well-known journalist of the time, comments that “. . . editorials 
in those days interested readers more than the news” (30). Milton Israel discusses 
the fact that editorial policy of newspapers receiving fi nancial assistance was 
monitored by the latter. He writes: “Government concentrated its advertising 
revenue in the major Anglo-Indian and Indian papers which would guarantee a 
reasonable circulation and readership. It was these papers whose editorial poli-
cies most interested the Home Department” (58). A history of the Indian press’ 
subjection to censorship is provided in an appendix in my book entitled Bearing 
Witness: Partition, Independence, End of the Raj, forthcoming from the University 
of Calgary Press.
 2 In 1947, a number of cartoons comment on this troubling matter of exclusion, 
or marginalizing of the people, in the last stage of the freedom movement. The 
one that I found most telling is “Kia Ho Raha Hai?” (“What’s Happening?”) 
(Janata, 1 June). A peasant, whose anxiety is signalled by the sweat pouring off 
his face, stands outside a closed door that has a sign, “Last (?) Conference,” post-
ed on it. Sounds of battle—“Dominion Status,” “Notional Zones,” “Division,” 
and so on—emerge from behind the door.
 3 The editorial cartoon is defi ned in the World Encyclopedia of Cartoons as a car-
toon that is “meant to illustrate or amplify a point, whether political, satirical, 
social or rhetorical.” The political cartoon is generally defi ned, here by David 
Low, as “a drawing, representational or symbolic, that makes a satirical, witty, 
or humourous point” (qtd. in Harrison 43). It usually comments “on public 
and political matters” (Rowland 11) and typically appears in editorial pages. 
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Jawaharlal Nehru also defi ned the cartoon when speaking of one of India’s most 
famous cartoonists of the time, Shankar. He writes: “a true cartoonist is not just 
a maker of fun but one who sees the inner signifi cance of an event and by a few 
master strokes impresses it on others” (qtd. in Shankar). I use the terms editorial 
cartoon and political cartoon interchangeably.
 4 For instance, the Evening Star (a Calcutta daily supportive of the Muslim League) 
published a letter to the editor written by a “decent citizen” on 29 May 1947, in 
which the writer upbraids the Amrita Bazar Patrika for publishing an irreverent 
cartoon on Jinnah in its 18 May issue. In this cartoon, apparently Jinnah was de-
picted “as a shoe-shine boy, polishing the shoes of Mr. Winston Churchill.” The 
writer adds the following comment: “It was an indecent cartoon. . . . Obviously 
it was meant only to wound the feelings of the Muslims” and warns of its ef-
fect: “naturally such provocations cannot but add to communal ill-feelings.” 
Similarly, a daily supportive of the Congress, the National Herald, expressed 
outrage when Qandil, an Urdu newspaper, published an irreverent cartoon on 
Gandhi. The former re-published the cartoon (in its 16 September 1947 issue) 
along with a lengthy comment directed to “. . . all decent-minded Leaguers,” 
part of which I reproduce here: “It is with a deep sense of humiliation and 
sorrow and with apologies to Gandhiji, whose Christ-like spirit no scurrility 
can touch, that we publish this cartoon. . . . This is the depth to which yellow 
journalism in Pakistan has sunk.”
   A comment about ‘self-censorship.’ In 1947, editors of Indian newspapers 
formed part of an ad hoc advisory committee that monitored press reports on 
‘communal’ rioting to ensure these were not in violation of the Code (Basu 
608).
 5 The nationalist press was the dominant sector of the press. It includes papers 
that can be considered to have been closely aligned with the anti-colonial move-
ment and thus become supporters of the ‘mainstream’ political group with 
which the movement itself was associated for decades, the Congress. They span 
the spectrum of political support for the Congress, from critical to identifi ca-
tory but shared with it a preference for a ‘modern,’ secular, democratic state, 
and an undivided India. They formed a block distinct from newspapers closely 
affi liated with other political groups, such as the Muslim League and the Hindu 
Mahasabha. This majority press occupied roughly the same position vis-à-vis the 
(English) reading public as did the Indian National Congress vis-à-vis the base of 
popular support. Press and Congress expressed, in general, the benevolence typi-
cal of a majority community, considering their political and social platform to be 
secular and modern but others—such as the Muslim League press—considered 
them to be primarily and fundamentally ‘Hindu.’ 
   The Hindustan Times was founded in 1923. Its initial purpose, according to 
Sahni, was to promote the cause of the Sikhs as well as “support the nation-
al movement” (Truth 3). The Janata was a weekly closely associated with the 
26
Suke sh i  K amra
Congress Socialist Party, a group within the Congress. The Leader was estab-
lished in 1909 in Allahabad. It was often critical of Congress policy, especially of 
Gandhian tactics such as non-co-operation. The National Herald was founded in 
1938 by Jawaharlal Nehru, who was a frequent contributor to the paper as well. 
According to Parthsarthy, this paper “was in the vanguard of the freedom strug-
gle and became a propaganda forum for the leaders of the movement” (304) and, 
of all Indian papers, it “suffered most from government oppression and persecu-
tion” (152). The Pioneer was established in the 1870s also in Allahabad, and was 
the dominant Anglo-Indian paper in the north. In1932, some princely states 
acquired control and they extended ownership to the land-owning class. The 
paper was identifi ed as “an establishment paper” of the princely elite (Israel 213). 
This paper too was frequently critical of the Congress. The Tribune was estab-
lished in Lahore in 1881. It refl ected the view of the Punjabi elite. It was often 
critical of the Congress. The Tribune was not published between 16 August and 
24 September, 1947, and relocated fi rst to Simla then to Ambala because of the 
Partition.
 6 This is not to deny that other segments of the press, with other political affi lia-
tions, such as the Muslim League press (Dawn, Eastern Times, the Star), engaged 
in othering and by near-identical means. However, their market share was con-
siderably smaller and, being the ‘minority’ culture, they spent much time and 
energy spinning and respinning a narrative of victimization. Hence, Gandhi, the 
other in the League press, fi gures differently and for different reasons than does 
Jinnah in the nationalist press. Their editorial culture, in 1947, merits its own 
discussion.
 7 In the popular imagination of the Congress-affi liated elite, modernity, in itself 
synonymous with progress, was identical with a capitalist economy, and scien-
tifi c and technological advance.
   Recently, Gyan Prakash has offered an interesting interpretation of the Indian 
narrative of modernity that evolved during the colonial era, an interpretation 
that challenges the by now naturalized assumption that modernity in India 
merely mimicked western modernity (and badly at that). In Another Reason: 
Science and the Imagination of India, he cautions: “There is simply no way to tidy 
up this messy history of India and narrate it as the victory of capital over com-
munity, modernity over tradition, West over non-West. These neat oppositions 
exist side by side with the history of their untidy complexities and intermixtures. 
One does not negate the other—difference does not cancel identity, hybridity 
does not dissolve opposition, capital does not erase community—but rather, one 
enables the other’s reformulation” (234).
 8 Judith Brown notes that of the 15.1 per cent of India’s literate population, in 
1941, only 18.9 per cent were literate in English (260). This represents 2.8 per 
cent of the total literate population. The two most exhaustive discussions of co-
lonial education and the complexity of the discourse of empire in colonial India 
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are Gauri Viswanathan’s Masks of Conquest: Literary Study and British Rule in 
India and Gyan Prakash’s Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern 
India.
 9 The most infamous images of Partition are of train loads of butchered bodies ar-
riving at railway stations, miles-long columns of refugees (it took some columns 
three days to go past a given point) being attacked, raped, forcibly circumcised, 
mutilated and murdered. Khushwant Singh’s novel, Train to Pakistan, was the 
fi rst novel in English to treat the subject. It was published in 1956. Since then 
there has been more by way of fi ctional and non-fi ctional testimonial. The two 
recent studies that both reproduce and offer discussion of testimonials by survi-
vors of Partition are Butalia’s The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of 
India and Ritu Menon and Kamla Bhasin’s Borders and Boundaries. The govern-
ments of India and Pakistan have published offi cial accounts that provide statis-
tical information on numbers dislocated, number of refugee camps, and provide 
detailed information about the impact Partition had on communities where, in 
many instances, classes of trades were left vacant since many trades were commu-
nity specifi c (shoe makers for instance). Indian governmental publications in-
clude: After Partition (Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1948), 
Millions on the Move: The Aftermath of Partition (Delhi: Ministry of Information 
and Broadcasting, [1949]) and Facts About the Recovery of Abducted Persons in 
India and Pakistan (Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1953). The Pakistan 
government’s The Journey to Pakistan: A Documentation of Refugees of 1947 
(Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1993) and Ian Talbot’s Freedom’s Cry: The 
Popular Dimension in the Pakistan Movement and Partition Experience in North-
West India offer facts and fi gures based on Pakistani documents.
 10 It is a fact that as much as the press refl ects the mood of the nation, at least that 
of its readership, it reinforces the marginalization of the people and the sense of 
panic by its naturalizing of a narrowed political landscape.
 11 Jinnah had been attacked before. In fact, one can trace the beginnings of a dis-
course we recognize as the discourse of othering to the early 1930s. Such othering 
was fuelled in no small part by comments such as the following made by Nehru 
in a chapter he added to his autobiography in 1941: “Mr. M.A. Jinnah’s leader-
ship, was aggressively anti-nationalist and narrow-minded . . . . There was no 
constructive suggestion, no attempt to even meet half-way, no answers to ques-
tions as to what exactly they [the League] wanted. It was a negative programme of 
hatred and violence, reminiscent of Nazi methods” (emphasis mine 605).
 12 Of course, the missing piece of logic, in these cartoons, is the given for this 
press—that Jinnah’s Pakistan demand was blamed for the communal strife: 
Jinnah authors the Pakistan demand (according to this reading, anyway), and 
the demand in turn leads to Partition, a division that was responsible for dev-
astating violence. This spelling out of the entire logic of the association is to be 
found in “Haunted” (Leader, 16 Sept), that appears to draw on Frankenstein 
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and A Christmas Carol. A small, well-dressed, panicky Jinnah, with monocle 
fl ying, fl ees from two towering hooded fi gures/“Ghosts of the Victims of Riots” 
whose skeletal fi ngers point accusingly at him. They ask him: “Has Pakistan 
Solved Any Problems” and “Or Has It Multiplied Problems?” The fact that 
these fi gures, Partition abstracted and embodied at the same time, haunt him 
and no one else (there is no other fi gure in the frame) suggests he is the cause 
of the catastrophe and must bear the burden of the history he has authored 
(not fl ee it). It is interesting to note, however, that the visual syntax suggests an 
undecidability when it comes to focus. The distortion of perspective—making 
the ‘ghosts’ larger than life and Jinnah a midget in the face of the dead (here too 
there are echoes of Frankenstein)—suggests a greater preoccupation with the 
horrifi c turn in Indian history that Partition represents and an inadequacy of 
even the ‘located’ agent.
 13 It is interesting to note that Partition seems to have made even the non-verbal 
incommensurate with the experience. Many newspapers offer photographs rather 
than cartoons and, at the very least, alongside cartoons, especially post-August 
13 or so and extending into September 1947. In “Photographs of Agony,” John 
Berger writes tellingly about what it is the choice of photography to ‘tell’ war 
stories suggests (his analysis, of course, predates live coverage of war like we have 
seen with the Iraq war and now with the war waged in Afghanistan). “We are 
seized by them” (38), he writes. Of the war photograph’s pointing out to readers 
the separation of “our time” from “its time” he writes: “We try to emerge from the 
moment of the photograph back into our lives. As we do so, the contrast is such 
that the resumption of our lives appears to be a hopelessly inadequate response 
to what we have just seen” (38). So, perhaps, there is a recognition that the pho-
tograph only underlines the unavailability of adequate discourse and action.
 14 Liaquat Ali Khan served as the General Secretary of the Muslim League, became 
Jinnah’s Chief Lieutenant in the Central Assembly and was Pakistan’s fi rst Prime 
Minister with Jinnah choosing to serve as Governor General. Liaquat was assas-
sinated in October 1951.
   The only article I have come across that attempts to do a longitudinal study 
of a regional newspaper—Vartman—suggests the choice of textual layering 
was shared by the local and regional levels. In “The Vartman and Pakistan: 
The ‘Daily’ Reality of Partition,” Saumya Gupta states that in the mid-1940s, 
“The preferred and oft-repeated analogy for Gandhi and Jinnah became that 
of Chamberlain and Hitler—Gandhi, like Chamberlain, bending backwards to 
appease the fi rebrand, aggressive Hitleresque Jinnah” (183).
 15 Hitler is treated similarly in some cartoons published in British dailies in the 
early 1940s. See Douglas 76, 196.
 16 Here the opposition delegitimizes the ‘Muslim’ faith along with the fi gure 
(Jinnah’s face is imposed on the sickle moon). The cartoon thus discovers a need, 
expressed by other political groups too at the time, to dismiss the symbolic sys-
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tems of the other along with leaders (which, in turn, suggests the role played by 
symbology in the attempt to build credible narratives of empowerment, a fact 
that is pointed out by Talbot in his discussion of the “symbolic signifi cance” of 
the Muslim National Guards. Their uniforms, the colours of the Muslim league 
fl ag, all worked to symbolize unity of the Muslims (71–72). A comment on the 
surplus meaning that attends the particular construction of natural forces in the 
cartoon: given the moon refl ects the light of the sun, pushing the visual syntax 
to its semantic limit we would have to conclude that the ill-regard the cartoonists 
express for Jinnah extends to the Congress. After all, the sun is the source of the 
moon’s light!
 17 Sardar Vallabhai Patel was one of the leaders of the nationalist movement and 
a prominent member of the Indian National Congress. He, along with Nehru, 
Gandhi and others was imprisoned many times by the colonial government. He 
was the home minister, minister of states and deputy minister in the fi rst Indian 
government and died in 1950.
 18 Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (born c. 1890) was a Muslim leader who opposed 
Partition and worked for an independent, united, secular India.  Like his friend, 
Mahatma Gandhi, he believed in nonviolent civil disobedience.
 19 Kathak is a form of dance typical of courtly, Muslim-infl uenced culture of parts 
of north India. This dance, performed by women, was a form of entertainment 
for local rulers.
   As many before me have noted, the nation and the nationalist movement were 
gendered too. However, here the image of the female employed was typically 
that of mother or wife. In the categorization of the female, then, we witness the 
same naturalized division as we fi nd in other expressions of Indian culture, these 
being mother and whore. See Partha Chatterjee’s “The Nationalist Resolution 
of the Women’s Question.” Recasting Women: Essays in Indian Colonial History. 
Eds. Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid, 233–53. In this defi nitive article, 
Chatterjee speaks of the co-opting of traditional Hindu texts during the anti-
colonial era in the interest of confl ating nation with the feminine, constructing 
Indian identity as one based in values of sacrifi ce, morality (purity) and non-
violence. He writes: “. . . it is undeniable that the specifi c ideological form in 
which we know the Sati-Savitri-Sita construct in the modern literature and arts 
of India today is wholly a product of the development of a dominant middle 
class culture coeval with the era of nationalism. It served to emphasize with all 
the force of mythological inspiration . . . the ‘spiritual’ qualities of self-sacrifi ce, 
benevolence, religiosity, etc” (248–49). See also Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, “The 
Story of Draupadi’s Disrobing: Meaning for Our Times.” Signposts: Gender Issues 
in Post-Independence India, 331–58.
 20 Husain Shaheed Suhrawardy was the leader of the Muslim League party of Bengal 
and the Chief Minister of the province in 1946. He moved to East Pakistan in 
1948, left the Muslim League and subsequently formed his own party.
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 21 A favorite image from the discourse of the fantastic is from the quintessential 
oriental text, Thousand and One Nights. In “Letting the Genie Loose” (Leader, 
19 March), Jinnah sits in an armchair while a towering genie in a cloud glares 
at him. The bottle out of which the genie has just emerged is labelled “League 
Ideology.” In the same paper, the 7 September “Cavalcade” devotes one frame 
to Jinnah which also draws on the Thousand and One Nights. The caption reads: 
“The Pen Is Mightier Than The Sword says Quaid-e-Azam.” Jinnah is imaged 
as a puny man with a feather in his hand while over him towers a giant with a 
sword in hand.
 22 Given the fact that 1947 is the year that ‘dates’ Indian history (turning it into 
a ‘pre’ and a ‘post’) and that it was the culminating year of a lengthy process of 
anti-colonial agitation, it is also the year that provides our dominant impression 
of the forces at play.
 23 In “Prose of Otherness,” Pandey comments on the by now commonly held view 
that Congress leaders gave in to the partitioning of India because of ‘communal-
ism.’ He writes: “Historians have argued that it was the explosion of violence, 
amounting to civil war, which convinced many who were until then strongly 
opposed to Partition that any other course would be even more fatal: that it led 
not only to the Congress leadership but large numbers of ordinary ‘non-political’ 
Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs to accept Partition as inevitable” (206).
   As Pandey states in The Construction of Communalism, the term ‘communal-
ism’ has a very specifi c meaning when used to describe community relations in 
the sub-continent: “In its common Indian usage the word ‘communalism’ refers 
to a condition of suspicion, fear and hostility between members of different 
religious communities” (6).
 24 Butalia’s Other Side offers many testimonials in which men remember the deaths 
of their womenfolk in terms of ‘honour.’ For a discussion of such testimonials 
see Chapters 2 and 3 of my book, Bearing Witness.
 25 See Bhabha’s “The Other Question: Stereotype, Discrimination and the Dis-
course of Colonialism.” The Location of Culture, 102–22.
 26 It is interesting to note that this is precisely how Nehru liked to imagine himself. 
In his autobiography he writes that although he considers himself a Marxist, to 
some extent his “roots” are “still perhaps partly in the nineteenth century, and 
[he has] been too much infl uenced by the humanist liberal tradition to get out 
of it completely” (591).
 27 Prakash writes that by “the early twentieth century . . . the authority of science 
had become widely dispersed. Fields ranging from social and religious reform to 
literary writings, and urban spaces ranging from major colonial cities to small 
district towns witnessed the permeation of science as a grammar of transforma-
tion” (63). He also comments on the place of the elite, “Western-educated men” 
(64), in the as the ideology itself gained ground: “thought limited in size and dif-
ferentiated by religion, rank, and language, the class formed by these men came 
to represent modernity and to achieve prominence in colonial India” (64).
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 28 The benevolent view of the Congress has been challenged somewhat in academic 
circles but not in the popular view. The former has been looking critically at the 
Congress for at least the last thirty years, with historians such as Stanley Wolpert 
critiquing the Congress for its refusal to accept the reality of drift, along religious 
lines, between constituencies in the 1920s (30) and others such as Bimal Prasad 
critiquing it for its refusal to deal with communal problems, a strategy that 
reached “its high watermark in 1936–37” (307). Many, in fact, comment on 
the centrality of 1936–37 to a critique of the Congress, which refused to form a 
coalition ministry in U.P. Yet the popular view remains the easier, stereotypical 
one.
   Others, such as Robert Frykenberg, critique the Congress for the blindness 
typical of a majority community and comment on the role played by such blind-
ness in determining history. He writes that any group “which is dominant” en-
joys “hegemonic power and authority” and “overtly” controls “the institutions 
which lie at the centre of a complex and pluralistic society”(14). It claims to 
“represent society as a whole, or at least its ‘majority,’” and “claiming to speak for 
the future . . . characterises itself and is described as being ‘modern’” (14). He 
notes that the Congress, being the dominant “minority” at the time was enabled 
to express what he describes as a “softer form of fundamentalism” (23) that was 
“covert” and “amorphous” (19). The benevolent view of Congress is matched by 
a number of historical analyses that offer Jinnah as a reactionary. To quote only 
one historian: “it is diffi cult even today to contest the validity of the argument of 
Nehru and his colleagues, that religion is not a satisfactory basis for nationality 
in the modern world, that multi-religious, multilingual, and even multiracial 
societies should seek a political solution within the framework of a federal struc-
ture” (Nanda 166).
   The Pakistani view of the relations between Congress and Jinnah is well repre-
sented by M.A.H. Ispahani, I.H. Quraishi, Zahid Husain. In general, this view 
blames the dominant culture for manipulating religious and secular terminol-
ogy to its advantage. The best-known and revisionist reading is to be found 
in Ayesha Jalal’s book, The Sole Spokesman, Jinnah, the Muslim League and the 
Demand for Pakistan was published in 1985. She looks at the contradiction in-
herent between Jinnah’s actions and rhetoric to prove (what had been earlier only 
a suggestion made by some historians) that Pakistan was intended by Jinnah to 
be a bargaining chip. The strategy worked till 1946, when he signalled his ac-
ceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan, which allowed for a Muslim block within 
the Indian state. 1947, according to her, “saw the tragic collapse of Jinnah’s strat-
egy—tragic, because the Quaid-I-Azam had always tried to keep himself above 
communalism in its cruder forms and had cherished his own vision of Indian 
unity” (208). Others focus more on the reasons for the Pakistan movement than 
on Jinnah, but make the same point about the blindness of the dominant culture 
to the rhetoric of minoritism. Gyan Pandey, for instance, notes in “The Prose 
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of Otherness,” that in India “. . . the history of the movement for Pakistan gets 
extremely short shrift. As the Other of genuine nationalism, it is the history of 
a political consciousness gone wrong and is painted in entirely negative colours” 
(204). Ian Talbot makes the point that the desire for a separate homeland is 
automatically disqualifi ed in historical evaluations of the nationalist movement 
(one of the contexts in which the comment is made is when he speaks about 
the Partition, that a comprehensive understanding of the moment must include 
“the enthusiasm which many shared for Pakistan, and the sense of purpose and 
direction given by the hope of a Muslim homeland” [143]) as did C.H. Phillips 
and Mary Doreen Wainwright before him in the “Introduction” to The Partition 
of India (see p. 12). Summaries of the many contestations that obtain in Indian 
historiography can be found in the Mushirul Hasan’s India’s Partition: Process, 
Strategy and Mobilization (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), his India 
Partitioned: The Other Face of Freedom (New Delhi: Roli Press, 1995) Vol 1 and 
in Bearing Witness.
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